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Recent Decisions
ARMED

SERVICES-CONSCIENTIOUS

CONCEPT OF

GOD

NOT

OBJECTORS-BELIEF

REQUIRED

FOR

IN

ORTHODOX

EXEMPTION-The Supreme

Court of the United States has held that § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act exempts individuals who deeply and
sincerely hold beliefs, purely ethical or moral in source and content,
which impose a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any
war at any time.
Welsh v. United States, -

U.S.

-,

90 S. Ct. 1792 (1970).

The petitioner sought an exemption from combatant service in the
Armed Forces of the United States as a conscientious objector pursuant
to § 60) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act.'
That section reads, in part:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any
person to be subject to combatant training and service in the
armed forces of the United States who by reason of religious
training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation
in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme
Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.2
Although petitioner was raised in a religious home, he did not belong to a religion which taught its members not to engage in war at
any time for any reason. During his early manhood, he dropped all
ties with organized religion. And at the time of his initial draft
registration, he had not yet come to accept pacifist principles.
When petitioner did make application for Conscientious Objector
status, he had difficulty with certain portions of the signed statement.
He could only subscribe to the statement, "I am by reason of my religious training and belief, conscientiously opposed to participation
in war in any form," after crossing out the words "religious training
1.

Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 60), 62 Stat. 612.

2. Id. An amendment to the act in 1967, deleted the reference to a "Supreme Being"
but continued to provide that "religious training and belief" does not include "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a purely moral code." 81 Stat. 104,
see also 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1967).
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and." He also chose to leave open the question of his belief in a Supreme Being.3
The petitioner was denied the exemption because no religious basis
for his beliefs could be found. 4 He subsequently refused to submit to
induction.
The petitioner was convicted by a United States District Court of
refusing to submit for induction into the United States Armed Forces
in violation of 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a). The Court of Appeals, Judge
Hamley dissenting, affirmed the conviction. 5 The United States Supreme Court reversed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether this
case falls under the Court's decision in United States v. Seeger.6 The
Court held that section 6(j) exempts from military service all objectors
whose conscience would give them no rest because of deeply held
7
moral, ethical or religious beliefs.
In deciding this case, the Court, Mr. Justice Black speaking for the
majority, found its decision in Seeger8 controlling.
In that decision, the Court sought to define the phrase "religious
training and belief" as used in section 6(j) of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act. Its conclusion was that, "A sincere and
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place
parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for
the exemption comes with the statutory definition."9
Mr. Justice Black, interpreting the Seeger test for religious objection, said, "What is necessary ... is that this opposition to war stem

from the registrant's moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is
right and wrong and that these beliefs be held with the strength of
traditional religious convictions.' 0
In the instant case, the Government sought to distinguish the holding in Seeger on two grounds. First, the Government argued that
Welsh specifically denied that his views were religious. In filling out
3. In his original application in April of 1964, Welsh stated that he did not believe
in a Supreme Being but in a letter to his local draft board in March of 1965, he requested
that his original answer be stricken and the question be left open. Brief for Appellant
at 29, Welsh v. United States, -

U.S. -,

-, 90 S. Ct. 1792 (1970).

4. Id. at 52.
5. 404 F.2d 1078 (1968).
6. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). Certiorarigranted, 396 U.S. 816 (1969) to determine whether
the case at note was controlled by Seeger.
7. Welsh v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 90 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (1970).
8. Id. at 1794.
9. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965),
, ,90 S.Ct. 1792, 1796 (1970).
10. Welsh v. United States, - U.S.
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the conscientious objector application, Seeger placed the word "religious" in quotation marks, while Welsh deleted the word entirely
from his statement. Welsh subsequently stated that his beliefs had
been formed "by reading in the field of history and sociology.""
The Government also sought to distinguish Seeger by arguing that
Welsh's views were "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical
'or' a merely personal moral code." In this case, he would be specifically excluded by the language of § 6(j).12
The Court responded to the first argument by saying that undue
emphasis was placed on Welsh's own denial of the religious basis of
his beliefs.' 3 It argued that when a registrant characterizes his own beliefs as "religious" it is highly relevant, but very few registrants are
fully aware of the broad scope of the word "religious" as used in § 6(j),
and accordingly a registrant's statement that his beliefs are non-religious is a highly unreliable guide for those charged with administer4
ing the exemption.'
The second government argument was similarly dismissed because
the Court felt that registrants who had strong feelings toward public
policy were not automatically excluded. Only two groups were so
excluded: 1) those whose beliefs were not deeply held, and 2) those
whose objection to war rested solely upon pragmatism or considerations of policy as opposed to moral, ethical, or religious principles.' 5
Based on this analysis the majority of the Court held that Petitioner's beliefs were "religious" under the Seeger test and constituted a
sufficiently important aspect of his opposition to war so as to qualify
him for an exemption under § 6(j).' 5 Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice
Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall joined in this opinion.
Mr. Justice Harlan provided the necessary fifth vote by concurring
in the result while rejecting the majority opinion's logic. In a separate
concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan, objecting to the interpretation given to § 6(j), said:
Unless we are to assume an Alice-in-Wonderland world where
words have no meaning, I think it fair to say that Congress' choice
of language cannot fail to convey to the discerning reader the
Very policy choice that the Court today completely obliterates:
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Supra note 3, at 22.
Welsh v. United States, - U.S.
Id.
Id.
Id. at -, 90 S.Ct. at 1798.
Id.

-- -,

90 S. Ct. 1792, 1797 (1970).
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that between conventional religions that usually have an organized and formal structure and dogma and a cohesive group identity, even when non-theistic, and cults that represent schools of
thought and in the usual case are without formal structure or are,
who share
at most, loose and informal associations of individuals
17
common ethical, moral, or intellectual views.
Mr. Justice Harlan argued that the real issue in this case was
whether the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment precludes
refusing exemptions to persons holding views not based on organized
theism. 18 Feeling that it did, he found only two alternatives: declare

it a nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that the
legislature intended to benefit, or extend the coverage of the statute
to include those who are aggrieved by exclusion. 19
Mr. Justice Harlan chose the second alternative in the instant case
20
because it provided the only possible remedy for the Petitioner.
Mr. Justice White wrote the dissent in which the Chief Justice and
Mr. Justice Stewart joined. The dissent raised two major points: First,
the construction of the statute given by the majority fails to reflect the
apparent intention of Congress. And, as Mr. Justice White said, "Our
obligation in statutory construction cases is to enforce the will of Congress, not our own; this construction exempts from the draft a class of
persons to whom Congress has expressly denied an exemption." 2 ' Second, the Establishment Clause argument of Mr. Justice Harlan fails
for two reasons:
1) Welsh did not have standing to raise the issue. Mr. Justice White
argued by analogy: "If the Constitution expressly provided that aliens
should not be exempt from the draft, but Congress purported to exempt them and no others, Welsh, a citizen, could hardly qualify for
exemption by demonstrating that exempting aliens is unconstitutional." 22 And, he concluded, "He has no standing to raise the establishment issue even if § 6(j) would present no First Amendment prob'2
lems if it had included Welsh and others like him. 3
2) Congress had the power to limit exemptions from the draft to
those opposed to war by virtue of religious training and belief. Citing
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

22.

Id.

23.

Id.
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Sunday Closing Cases,2 4 Mr. Justice White maintained that an"Establishment Clause argument can only be sustained in the absence of a
secular legislative purpose. In the case of § 6(j), the purpose could either be "a purely practical judgment that religious objectors, however
admirable, would be of no more use in combat that many others unqualified for military service." 25 In the alternative the reason could
have been a legislative belief that "to deny the exemption would violate the Free Exercise Clause or at least raise grave problems in this
respect."

26

Whichever of these reasons motivated the decision to exempt religious objectors, the Minority concludes, Welsh was clearly not one of
27
those who prompted Congress to so decide.
The issue of whether or not exemptions for conscientious objection
require a belief in God have been the subject of a good deal of argument. Welsh represents a choice on the part of the Court that such belief is not required.
The discussion of the requirement that Conscientious Objectors believe in a more or less orthodox concept of God was highlighted by a
seeming debate between the Second-and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal.
In 1943, the Second Circuit in Kauten v. United States28 held that
the phrase, by reason of "religious training and belief," included a response to an "inward mentor" whether that was God or conscience.
Kauten also held that those excluded were those who believed a particular war to be "inexpedient or disastrous. ' 29 This same view was advanced again that year and the followirig.30
The Ninth Circuit responded to this interpretation in United States
v. Berman.81 Quoting Chief Justice Hughes in his dissent in United
States v. Macintosh,12 the Court held that the belief required was one
in relation to "an authority higher and beyond any worldly one," and
that "the essence of religion is belief in a relation to God33involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation."
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
States
31.
32.
33.

366 U.S. 420 (1961).
Welsh v. United States, - U.S. -, 90 S. Ct. 1792, 1812 (1970).
Id.
Id. at -, 90 S. Ct. at 1814.
133 F.2d 703 (1943).Id. at 708.
United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (C.A.2d Cir. 1943); United
ex rel. Reel v. Badt, 141 F.2d 845 (CA.2d Cir. 1944).
156 F.2d 377 (1946).
283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931).
156 F.2d 377, 380 (1946).
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In 1948, Congress took the statute which at that time made no reference to a deity and defined religious training and belief as "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties supe,,34
rior to those arising from any human relation ....
Being" was striking
"Supreme
The introduction into the statute of
enough. Congress then went on to utilize the very words of Chief Jus35
tice Hughes' dissent in Macintosh and to cite Berman as authority.
United States v. Seeger3 was the next opportunity that the Supreme
Court had to consider the question of the theistic requirement for
conscientious objection. Seeger was an ironic consolidation of three
circuit court decisions. Two were Second Circuit reversals of district
court convictions. The remaining case was a Ninth Circuit affirmation
of a district court conviction.

7

Mr. Justice Clark dealt extensively with the inter-circuit debate and
the congressional statutory charge. He addressed himself to the apparent congressional espousal of the Ninth Circuit interpretation. First,
he argued that Congress had used the expression "Supreme Being"
instead of Chief Justice Hughes' "God" so as to "embrace all religions
or philosophical views."38 He supported this interpretation by quoting
the Senate Armed Services Committee which recommended adoption,
saying, "This section reenacts substantially the same provisions as were
found in subsection 5 (g) of the 1940 act." 39 Secondly, Mr. Justice Clark
stated that the real issue to be determined is "whether a given belief
that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its posbelief in God of one who
sessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox
40
exemption.
the
for
clearly qualifies
The decision did not specifically state how to determine whether
something holds a parallel position to an orthodox belief in God. It
did make clear that an exemption based on conscientious objection
34. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612.
35. S. Rep. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948).
36. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
37. Certiorari, No. 50 was granted to review a decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, 326 F.2d 846, which reversed a conviction by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Certiorari, No. 51 was
granted to review a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 325 F.2d 409, which reversed a conviction by the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York. Certiorari, No. 29 was granted to review a decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 324 F.2d 173, which affirmed a conviction' by the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, Southern Division.
38. 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965).
39. Id. at 173.
40. Id. at 166.
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does not require an applicant to believe in a traditional concept of
God. It also clearly demonstrated that the Court rejected the narrow
interpretation of "religious training and belief" of the Ninth Circuit.
The case represents then a rejection of a narrow interpretation without an outer limit for broadness being set.
In this light, the Welsh decision takes on its real significance. Seeger
is authority for the point of view assumed in Welsh. But the instant
case takes that logic far further than Seeger.
The Court could have attempted to define "God" or "Supreme Being" in so broad a manner as to include practically any belief. It did
not choose to do this. Rather, it returned to the Seeger test, calling for
beliefs parallel to an orthodox belief in God and said:
If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs which are
purely ethical or moral in source and content but which nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time, those beliefs certainly occupy in
the life of that individual "a place parallel
to that filled by...
41
God" in traditionally religious persons.
The Court thus extended the Seeger test so as to include not only
unorthodox views of God, but also purely ethical and moral views
which occupy a position in the life of the holder parallel to that of
God for orthodox theists.
Of course, there are real problems with this line of argument. The
statute specifically states, "Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation.
S. ."42 This possibly explains Mr. Justice Black's restatement of the
arguments from Seeger defining "Supreme Being" in such an expan43
sive manner.
But his position might embody a far more profound logic than at
first appearance. Granted, for persons steeped in orthodox theism, it
seeems quite evident that when Congress defines "religious training
and belief" as being in relation to a "Supreme Being" it means exactly
that. But if one considers the practicality of the distinction between
those exempted and those not, the certainty is shaken. Congress refuses
exemptions to those holding views which are essentially political, phil41. Welsh v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 90 S. Ct. 1792, 1796 (1970).
42. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, §6(j), 62 Stat. 612.
43. Welsh v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 90 S. Ct. 1792, 1795 (1970).

1.1.9

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 9: 113, 1970

osophical, sociological or personal. It grants exemptions to views involving duties superior to human relationships.
The distinction seems to be between views which are academic,
which are debated and discussed and rarely acted upon, and those
views which require their holder to follow a certain course of action
regardless of consequences. Certainly, this distinction seems logical if
one considers that we are talking about who is going to serve in the
armed forces of the United States. For example, applicants for exemption might have a purely pragmatic reason for not wishing to serve,
whether or not they thought war was wrong. At the same time they
might be able to produce objective data of religiosity and belief in
God. However, absent sincerity, once ordered to report, they would
probably do so. And once inducted, they would probably serve as well
as anyone else.
But for that group of men for whom opposition to war in any form
is more important than any duties arising from human relations, jail
is -the only alternative. Men holding views this intensely, when faced
with the draft, eventually go to jail. The waste is appalling and senseless.
They go to jail because at some point conscience refuses to allow
them to act in opposition to it. At that point they face jail because of
bravery, and an utter disregard for their person in the face of what is
to them a moral wrong.
It can be reasonably argued that Congress did not intend this result.
Rather, in the course of raising an army, they simply intended to exempt men who, for sincere moral reasons, would not serve anyway.
But men raised in orthodox theism normally associate belief in God
with a force which causes one to act in a certain way as opposed to
merely thinking in a certain way. Therefore, they could have verbalized the distinction between sincerity and insincerity as that between
views grounded in a belief in God and political, philosophical, sociological or personal ones.
Possibly this is the thrust of Mr. Justice Black's opinion. Freed from
parochial religiosity, the honest meaning of the statute is to exempt
men from service who hold beliefs parallel to those held by believers
in orthodox theism. The rationale behind it being that honest and
sincere men should not go to jail simply because they do not believe
in the majority God, for this would be a violation of some of our most
basic principles..
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Even if this is an accurate analysis of Mr. Justice Black's position,
the practical effects of the decision remain to be considered. First, it is
important to note that an actual majority of the Court concur on only
one slim point. Mr. Justice Harlan in casting the fifth vote said, "I am
prepared to accept the Court's conscientious objector test, 44 not as a
reflection of congressional statutory intent, but as a patch work of judicial making that cures the defect of underinclusion in § 6(j) and can
45
be administered by local boards in the usual course of business."
Secondly, despite initial fears to the contrary, the decision does not
open the floodgates for conscientious objection. Based on the Welsh
test, it is no easier to prove conscientious objection. Some persons who
could not have qualified before will be able to gain exemptionnamely those who hold sufficiently strong convictions based on something other than an orthodox God. But the decision reemphasizes the
requirement of sincerity. Certainly this decision does not suddenly
create large numbers of sincere persons. And it may well eliminate objectors whose claim rests solely on objective data of religious affiliation.
Thirdly, the new test is not appreciably harder to administer than
older ones. 46 The most difficult thing to determine has: always been

sincerity. This decision requires a draft board to look beyond the
mere objective criterion of belief in God to determine the quantity
and quality of one's belief. The determination to be made is still
that one's belief is not held conveniently, based on purely practical
considerations. Therefore, only in those draft boards that have assumed that sincerity flowed automatically from a belief in God will an
adjustment have to be made.
Fourthly, in terms of the human consideration, the decision is eminently valid. Welsh stands for the proposition that the imprisonment
of men so brave as to accept any fate rather than to commit a moral
wrong serves no one. Men such as these are the subjects of congres44.' Id. at -, 90 S. Ct. at 1797. §6(j) exempts from military service those with a "sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to
that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption .... " with the
explanation that "(i)f an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs which are purely
ethical or moral in source and content but which nevertheless impose upon him a duty
of conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time, those beliefs certainly
occupy in the life of that individual 'a place parallel to that filled by . . . God' in traditionally religious persons."
45. Welsh v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 90 S. Ct. 1792, 1810 (1970).
46. Id. at -, 90 S. Ct. at 1810. Mr. Justice Harlan points out in footnote 19 that
during both World Wars grave difficulties were had limiting exemptions to religious objectors based on even the most objective criterion. Based on the World War I experience,
a presidential regulation dated March 20, 1918 opened exemptions to. all conscientious
objectors without regard to religious qualifications.
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sional exemption regardless of their belief in an orthodox God, because this is the only way that the nation can benefit from their sincerity.
The Welsh decision does not represent an attempt to enforce the
letter of the congressional will. Rather, it is an attempt to preserve
the practical thrust of § 60) without interpreting it so narrowly as to
raise grave first amendment doubts. The end result is a construction
of the statute that is undoubtedly offensive to some. But one that is
quite valid given the reason for exemptions based on conscientious
objection.
William C. Bartley

CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER-FELONY MURDER RULE-The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, utilizing language indicating dissatisfaction with the
felony murder rule,' has expressly overruled its prior decision in Com2
monwealth v. Almeida.
Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550
(1970).
On January 30, 1947, James Smith, along with Edward Hough and
David Almeida, engaged in the armed robbery of a Philadelphia supermarket. An off-duty police officer was shot and killed while attempting
to frustrate the escape of the felons. Evidence as to whether one of the
'felons fired the shot resulting in the officer's death was conflicting at
the trial level; the court however, charged the jury that the identity of
the individual who fired the shot was irrelevant:
Even if you should find from the evidence that Ingling was killed
by a bullet from the gun of one of the policemen, that policeman
having shot at the felons in an attempt to prevent the robbery or
the escape of the robbers, or to protect Ingling, the felons would
be guilty of murder, or if they did that 3in returning the fire of
the felons that was directed toward them.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree,
with punishment fixed at imprisonment for life.
I. In Pennsylvania, the felony murder rule punishes as first degree, all murders which
shall be committed in the perpetration of, or in attempting to perpetrate any arson,
rape, robbery, burglary, or kidnapping. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1939).
2. 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
3. Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 220, 261 A.2d 550i 558 (1970).-
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